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AA few years ago, I got a mug from one of my colleagues for my name day, with a sign that said: “2 litres per day, for real”. This colleague of mine saw during the long years 
spent next to me that I drink very little whilst 
working, while he knew that an adult has to 
drink at least two litres of water to preserve 
their health, not including black coffee that 
dehydrates our body. Instead of the mug, he 
could have written a mini-study repeating the 
well-known example of the theory of marginal 
utilities, which states that the first glass of 
water is much more valuable for a thirsty man 
than the second or the third one, and they do 
not even drink the fourth one. My colleague 
could have ended his scientific argument with 
the conclusion that I drink a maximum of 
one litre of water per day, concluded from the 
theory of marginal utilities, and, therefore, my E-mail addres:  szvpulay@uni-miskolc.hu
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health cannot be saved. he would have been 
right from a scientific point of view, but I was 
much happier with the mug. since then, I 
make a large batch of tea every morning and 
I drink it over the day sip by sip. Although, 
most probably I don’t drink the two litres even 
this way. 
This is what I thought while reading 
the article of Péter Mihályi titled ‘Marginal 
Utilities and Marginal Costs of having 
Children’ (public Finance Quarterly, 2019/4). 
The principal argument of the article is that 
in today’s modern society “when families 
make decisions about having a child ex ante, 
they calculate with steeply decreasing marginal 
utilities. In other words, the 1st baby brings a 
huge amount of pleasure (utility), while the 2nd 
and further babies bring less and less utilities.” 
The author also substantiates his argument 
with the theoretical derivation, comparison 
and illustration of the utilities and costs of 
having children with functions. The author 
points out that “the social utility of having 
children only has a slight influence on families; 
however, every new child’s social utility is almost 
the same. This explains politicians’ intentions to 
encourage families to have more children.” The 
final conclusion of the article is that “within 
the factors taken into consideration in the study, 
there is no equilibrium, and the observable 
trends will not result in a social optimum. 
Decreasing population and the aging of the 
society cannot be eliminated or significantly 
alleviated on national level, no matter the 
amount of money the government is willing to 
spend to take over some of the costs parents bear 
to have children.” (Citing from the abstract of 
the article.)
I cannot argue with the first part of the 
final conclusion: the conclusion that can be 
drawn from the model set in the study and 
the factors taken into consideration that the 
total fertility rate of 2.2 necessary for halting 
the aging of the population within national 
boundaries cannot, in fact, be achieved, as 
there will not be enough women giving birth 
to three or more children that could even 
out the contribution of women who do not 
have a child over their lifetime or women 
who “only” give birth to one child to the total 
fertility rate. It should, however, be noted 
that péter Mihályi’s model makes having two 
children seem like a rational decision even 
from an economic point of view. As a result, 
population policy should, by all means, strive 
to help families in the actual birth of the 
desired first and/or second child. The main 
obstacles to this include the lack of stable 
relationships, postponing having children 
until existential safety, as well as health issues. 
The state subsidies serving the elimination of 
these obstacles can be evaluated as rational 
and effective population policy measures even 
according to the models of péter Mihályi, as 
they lead to the increase of the total fertility 
rate. (Making the total fertility rate exceed 2 
does not only require more women to have 
at least three children but also the reduction 
of the rate of childless women and women 
giving birth to only one child compared to 
those having two children.) Naturally, these 
measures are rational also from the point of 
having the third child, as the third child can 
only be born if the second one has already 
been born. 
And we have already arrived to one of the 
big dilemmas of population policy. Is the 
promotion of the birth of the desired third 
and additional children more effective from 
the point of increasing the total fertility rate, 
or should state assets rather be focused on 
eliminating the obstacles preceding the birth 
of the first and second child? The obvious 
answer is that the former cannot be effective 
without the latter, as many families having two 
children are needed for it to be possible that 
an appropriate number of families consider 
having the third child. 
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The solution of the dilemma also includes 
a common part, namely to facilitate having 
children at a younger age. Between 1992 and 
2011, the mean age of giving birth to the first 
child shifted from 23 to 28.3. on the one 
hand, this carries the risk that the women 
postponing to have their first child run out 
of their fertile life phase, and on the other 
hand, postponing childbearing to a later date 
also results in the fact that there will not be 
sufficient time for having the second and the 
third child. In 1992, the difference between 
the mean age of having the first child and the 
age when women have given birth to all of 
their children was more than three years. This 
difference dropped below two years by 2010 
(kapitány, spéder, 2012). From the point of 
the success of the population policy, halting 
the tendency of postponing childbearing 
is a fundamental factor. population policy 
is not left without means in this regard, 
either. one group of means is formed by the 
establishment of the employment security 
of mothers (and fathers) with children, as a 
result of which women who decide to have 
children will not have to be afraid of losing 
their jobs. My own research (pulay, 2010) 
showed that the countries where family and 
employee roles could be concerted achieved 
a relatively high fertility index in the past 
two decades. The other group of means is 
formed by the material subsidies enabling 
the earlier establishment of existential safety. 
A good example of the complex approach is 
the childbirth incentive loan that contributes 
to bringing forward the creation of the 
existential conditions considered necessary 
for having children (e.g. proper housing) 
in the case of all young married couples (of 
fertile age), but the extent of subsidy depends 
on the number of children the couple 
commits to have. The impacts of the family 
policy measures taken in the past couple of 
years can already be felt in this regard, as the 
mean age of having the first child increased 
by only 0.3 years between 2011 and 2017. 
The mean age of women when having all their 
children also increased with the same rate, 
thus, the difference between the two mean 
ages has not narrowed further (kapitány, 
spéder, 2018). Although this does not mark 
the reversing of the trend, only the stopping 
of the unfavourable tendency, it can already 
be considered a result.
With the foregoing, I strived to point 
out that there is a scope of actions for 
taking effective population policy measures 
(increasing the total fertility rate) even if 
we accept the model of péter Mihályi. At 
the same time, it cannot be disputed that 
for achieving the total fertility rate of 2.2, 
it is needed for many families to desire three 
or more children and that such children be 
born, too. 
In his article (on page 531), péter Mihályi 
puts it like this: “the fact that we assumed a 
monotonously decreasing utility function in 
the present paper does not represent anything 
special – equilibrium models almost always 
make this assumption. The novelty of this 
approach is that we assume a steeply decreasing 
function, because we model today’s situation in 
Hungary, when the majority of families don’t 
plan 3-4-5 or more children by default.” 
I consider it forward-thinking that péter 
Mihályi considers and shows the factors 
influencing childbearing by setting up a 
model, as this motivates those discussing 
population policy to follow the strict logic 
of mathematical models. Taking up the 
gauntlet, in the remaining part of my paper, 
I will substantiate my argument that the 
assumptions of péter Mihályi incorporated 
into the model are not all correct and that the 
model does not take into consideration many 
significant factors. 
Equilibrium models do, in fact, assume 
a reducing utility function, but this does 
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not necessarily mean that the reduction of 
marginal utility will occur right after the 
“consumption” of the first unit. This also 
depends on the nature of the phenomenon 
examined. If anyone wants to quench their 
thirst with a glass of wine, the principle of 
reducing utility prevails from the second glass 
on. If, however, they want to lift their mood 
with the wine, we can only talk about the 
reduction of utility after the third or fourth 
glass. And if our subject wants to get drunk, 
the utility of drinking wine will hardly reduce 
until consuming the first litre. It’s similar in 
the case of having children, too. The parents 
planning more than one child do not simply 
want two or three children: they want to have 
a vibrant community that love each other, in 
which the children also have their partners and 
where there is a lively family life. The family 
raising three children is not a family having 
1+1+1 children, but a family with three 
children, where marginal utilities do not add 
up, but create a different quality.  Naturally, 
if this quality difference is not incorporated 
into the model, utility will, indeed, drop 
dramatically, just like when we were thinking 
about puppies or hamsters: if we already have 
one, why would we need two, and especially 
three? 
The young people or married couples who 
say that they would like at least three children 
do not have these ideas because they try to 
meet the expectations of the person asking 
them. They long for the big family way of life, 
because they were also raised in a big family, 
or they saw other big families amongst their 
acquaintances and it was appealing to them, 
or they have experienced that it is not good to 
grow up as an only child or without a sibling 
of the same sex. As a consequence, the unit 
of measurement of péter Mihályi’s utility 
function is incorrect. After two children, the 
scale starts all over: those wanting to have 
three or more children do not want 2+1 
children, but a big family, which is another 
quality. Naturally, it occurs frequently in 
practice that a family planning many children 
only has one or two children, as the hardships 
of life hinder their desires from being fulfilled. 
There are also examples of what péter Mihályi 
mentions that in the case of two children of 
the same sex, families who originally planned 
on having a boy and a girl would venture to 
have a third child. In such situations, family 
policy has an obvious scope of competence, 
as it can eliminate the obstacles of having the 
desired third child. 
By elaborating the new quality of families 
with several children, we arrived to the other 
great dilemma of family policy: can the big 
family way of life be made appealing? Up 
until recent times, the big family way of 
life (with a few exceptions) meant relative 
poverty, which meant that families with 
three children were in much worse financial 
situation than those without any children 
or those having one or two children. It is 
obvious that the situations arising from this 
relative poverty did not make the big family 
way of life appealing to outsiders. They did 
not have a proper car in which they could 
all fit into, women were vulnerable to their 
husbands financially, they didn’t have money 
for trendy clothes, vocational training or 
denture. (There’s good reason why I wrote the 
latter, as many pregnancies can ruin women’s 
teeth, and denture costs astronomical sums.) 
The children could not go abroad to learn 
languages. If men ensured better living 
circumstances for their families through 
hard wok, they lost their eligibility for social 
subsidies, as there was no independent family 
policy, only social policy. At the same time, 
those having lived in the big family usually 
found their joy in it, and this joy was also 
radiated to others. 
The big questions is this: if family policy 
establishes enhanced financial security 
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for moms with multiple children (with 
exemption from paying personal income tax, 
right to flexible employment, supporting 
their vocational training, making denture free 
of charge), and if it pulls out big families from 
relative poverty (with tax allowances, housing 
and vehicle subsidies) and so it eliminates 
their alienating qualities, could the desire 
for a big family be aroused in more young 
people? I think this is not hopeless, as the 
pattern coming from above has a significant 
demonstration effect. (The significant increase 
taking place in the number of marriages in 
the past few years is remarkable. presumably 
it was not the result of the tax allowances 
worth a couple of thousand Forints: it rather 
occurred because marriage became the pattern 
to be followed instead of the previously 
popular co-habitation without marriage.) If 
the big family way of life becomes exemplary 
in the upper third income layer of a society, 
it has a quite significant radiant effect. At 
the same time, this influence could only be 
amplified in the long term and it is difficult 
to estimate its exact extent. It can, however, 
be calculated that the subsidies concentrating 
and aggregating on 30-35 percent of women 
of childbearing age cannot reverse population 
trends. For the significant increase of the total 
fertility rate, family policy measures should 
make a much wider scope of big families be in 
a substantially favourable position. 
It is also reasonable to ask the question 
in relation to the article of péter Mihályi 
whether the families that only want one or 
two children account the marginal utilities of 
having children properly. Mihályi discusses 
the benefits of having children over the entire 
life of people very correctly, including not 
only the emotional fulfilment coming with 
little children, but the safety provided by adult 
children and the joys caused by grandchildren, 
too. however, while doing so, his model fails 
to consider many other factors. For example 
the fact also mentioned by him elsewhere 
that a substantial part of men and women do 
not have children at all. What does this mean 
from the point of grandchildren? The risk that 
even if I have a child, I may not be having a 
grandchild. If the rate of childlessness is 30 
percent, the probability of a person to have a 
grandchild in the case of having one child is 
70 percent, in the case of two children it is 91 
percent, and in the case of three children, it 
amounts to 97.3 percent. This means that one 
must have three children to make it almost 
absolutely certain that they will also get to 
enjoy grandchildren.
Another factor not incorporated into the 
model is migration abroad. If the probability 
of hungarian young person settling abroad 
after the age of 30 was 20 percent, then the 
probability of the parent hardly having any 
sense of the joy coming with children after their 
child’s age of 30 will be 20 percent in the case 
of one child (in the case of the grandchildren 
to be born abroad, the amount of joyful time 
spent together will be even less). In the case of 
two children, however, the chance of both of 
them settling down abroad is only 4 percent, 
and, in the case of three children, the chance 
of all three of them living abroad drops to 0.8 
percent. 
In spite of all that, the author could argue 
that he did not include these factors in his 
model, because these are generally not assessed 
by families either. This is true, but this is 
where the responsibility of counters weighs in. 
What does this mean? It means that not only 
the people who can argue with their papers 
smartly bear an increased responsibility for 
their words, but also the experts of the world 
of numbers and calculations are responsible 
for their models and the conclusions 
drawn from them. For example for making 
simplistic assumptions, or for the uncertainty 
factors they choose to calculate with in their 
models. Can the author of a scientific paper 
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be satisfied with incorporating the narrow 
perspective preferences of uninformed people 
into his model and drawing conclusions 
from that or is it his task to eliminate the 
information shortfall amongst people? This is 
not a theoretical question. We have just put 
a financial crisis that concerned hundreds of 
thousands in hungary behind us, the reason 
of which was that the population could not 
assess the risks of indebtedness in foreign 
currency properly, took out all the low interest 
loans and then their instalments multiplied 
after the fall of the exchange rate of the Forint. 
The leaders of counters (instead of a loud 
warning) incorporated the narrow perspective 
decisions of uninformed people into their 
narrow perspective models as positive factors. 
péter Mihályi also takes into consideration 
the social utility of families with multiple 
children in a limited manner. The utilities 
that are now gaining appreciation in modern 
societies have been left out of consideration 
exactly. one of them is team work. Every 
paper on the sociology of work highlights that 
in today’s society, one of the most important 
competencies is the ability to carry out work as 
a team, the adaptability necessary for working 
as a team, the ability to consider the aspects 
of the other person, etc. Where does one have 
the best shot for obtaining a competency like 
this? In a big family with multiple children. 
And one has a minimal chance to obtain this 
skill in a family where the two parents and 
the four grandparents spoil the single child or 
grandchild. 90-95 percent of future economies 
will be provided by services. Where will the 
workers willing to serve others be raised? In 
big families with multiple children. If the 
creator of the model fails to consider these 
quality factors, it is no wonder that the model 
indicates the lack of social optimum.
In his article, péter Mihályi mentions 
several relevant historical parallels. There 
are plenty of historical examples for the 
incorrect nature of people’s utility function, 
too. one of them is the tendency of having 
one child in entire regions, where peasant 
families only had one child so that they did 
not have to divide the estate between more 
children. Then they regretted it deeply when 
they were standing at the grave of their 
only child who died young. It turned out 
that their utility function did not consider 
fundamental conditions. This is not an 
intimidation: the large masses of old, lonely 
and vulnerable people without relatives is 
already a threatening reality today. 
The model of péter Mihályi confronts us 
with the fact that in the long run, the utility 
function of the totality of specific people 
cannot differ from the utility function of the 
society. If the social utility function requires 
the production of five units of a product, 
but only the production of three comes out 
from the entirety of the individual utility 
functions of the specific participants, it will 
result in a significant shortage. (At best, the 
shortage can be replaced from import, but 
then the conditions of importing must also 
be considered.) The responsibility of counters 
does not end with forecasting the catastrophic 
shortage. They must also pinpoint which 
factors are not taken into account by the 
utility function of individuals and how the 
utility function could be changed. 
It was an intellectual experience to read 
péter Mihályi’s article. I am, however, happy 
that I did not receive an intellectual study 
radiating despair from my counter colleague 
for my name day, but a mug instead, with a 
sign motivating for action and for rethinking 
my marginal utilities.
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